文章摘要
司法解散公司事由的实证研究
An Empirical Study on the Judicial Dissolution of Companies
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 司法解散公司  公司僵局  股东压制  不公平损害  信义义务
英文关键词: judicial dissolution of a company  company deadlock  shareholder oppression  unfair prejudice  fiduciary duty
基金项目:中国政法大学青年教师学术创新团队(16CXTD01)暨校级人文社科项目"民法总则制定中的商事主体立法研究"(15ZFZ82007)的阶段性成果。
作者单位
李建伟 中国政法大学民商经济法学院 
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中文摘要:
      关于一份解散之诉裁判书样本的实证分析发现,被解散公司的"经营管理困难"实质指向"管理困难"而非"赢利困境",管理困难的根源在于封闭型中小公司的股东人合性障碍导致的治理失灵。据此,将解散之诉的本质定位于治理失灵后的司法权介入,给予部分(少数)股东退出公司的低成本路径,更具立法论上的解释力,也得到裁判实务的经验支持。公司治理失灵的具体表象包括对立股东控制权势均力敌下的公司僵局与对立股东控制权势力悬殊下的股东压制,与此相对应,司法解散公司的事由也存在公司僵局与股东压制的二元化格局。公司僵局在立法论上被视为解散之诉的唯一事由,与裁判现实并不符合,但由于缺乏立法的明确规定等缘由,股东压制作为解散事由的事实在裁判中被淹没与压抑了。相关规范分析与实证研究都发现,将中国式股东压制也即"严重的复合性股东权侵害"添列为解散公司的事由,在我国存在现实的裁判规则方面的需求。由此,我国公司法应构建司法解散公司事由的"二元"格局,涵盖封闭型公司人合性障碍的所有情形,为股东提供更具实效的救济。
英文摘要:
      En empirical analysis of a sample dissolution decision shows that the "operational management difficulties" for the dissolution of a company means "management difficulties" rather than "profit predicament". The root cause of the management difficulties lies in the governance failure, which is a result of the obstacle of shareholders combination in closed small and medium companies. Therefore, considering the essence of dissolution lawsuit as the judicial intervention following the corporate governance failure that offers some (minority) shareholders a low-cost way to exit the company will be a more reasonable legislative explanation and may obtain the support from practical adjudicative experience. The concrete manifestations of corporate governance failure include company deadlock under the control of opposing shareholders that are evenly matched and shareholder oppression under the control of opposing shareholders with significantly disparity of strength. Correspondingly, the reasons for the dissolution of a company through judicial intervention also include dualism of company deadlock and shareholder oppression. In legislative theory, company deadlock is regarded as the only cause of dissolution lawsuits, which is not consistent with the adjudicative reality in China. However, due to the lack of clear provisions in the legislation, the fact that shareholder oppression is also considered a cause of dissolution in judicial practice has been ignored. According to relevant normative analysis and empirical research, it is necessary to add shareholder oppression, i.e. "serious compound infringement of shareholder rights", to the causes for the dissolution of companies in China, so that the dual pattern of judicial dissolution of companies established by Chinese Corporate Law will cover the obstacle of shareholders combination in closed companies, i.e. all situations of corporate governance and provide more effective relief to troubled shareholders.
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