| Under the policy guidance of the Central Government, which highly emphasizes coordinated development and security, local governments are increasingly prioritizing security issues. Under the dual logic of evading responsibility and striving for superiority, the competition among local governments in achieving governance goals related to ensuring safety has become an emerging trend that transforms the bureaucratic ecosystem of grassroots law enforcement across four dimensions, i.e., law enforcement resources, organizations, technology, and goals. Such transformation encompasses all stages of law enforcement activities from decision-making to formal implementation. While this competitive pattern suppresses slack law enforcement resulting from the efficiency deterioration within the bureaucracy, it may lead to, at stages or in fields of high-intensity competition, reduced efficiency in allocating law enforcement resources, failed coordination mechanisms within law enforcement organizations, compromised functionality of law enforcement technology, and deviations from expected standards in enforcing laws. These deviations are fundamentally caused by an ecological imbalance within the competitive environment shaped by security competition. To prevent or rectify such deviations in law enforcement practices, it becomes imperative to enhance the entire process of security risk governance mechanisms, adjust punishment intensity and incentive mechanisms, and optimize resource allocation within the law enforcement ecosystem through structural improvements. |
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