The publicness theory, represented by common carriers and new public utilities, aims to change the situation of the ineffective implementation of the antitrust law and restrain the market power of digital platforms by imposing special obligations. Although the publicness theory has a long history, its concepts are vague, which makes it difficult to define the scope of its regulation. The regulatory obligations it advocates, such as non-discrimination and universal service, prove challenging to independently implement in the absence of structural divestiture, price regulation, enter regulation and other measures. The regulation based on the nature of platform services also risks excessive market intervention. Economic regulation, on the other hand, not only is clearly defined but also limits the scope of regulation to platforms characterized by natural monopoly. As such, it is more suitable for the regulation of rapidly developing digital platforms. To realize the economic regulation of digital platforms, it is necessary to draw on the mature regulatory theories and practical experiences of traditional economic regulation. It is necessary especially to structurally separate platform functions with natural monopoly attributes, and impose interoperable obligations on platforms after separation. |