法学研究

文章摘要

为被告人利益抗诉与上诉不加刑原则之适用——以上诉理由之限制为中心

Protest for the Interest of the Defendant and the Application of the Principle of No Increase of Penalty on Appeal

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英文关键词: no increase of penalty on appeal|appeal reason|surprise judgment|cause of action|facts of public prosecution

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作者	单位
郭烁

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中文摘要:

上诉审体系中上诉理由的缺失,是当下上诉不加刑原则适用产生困惑的根源。上诉理由具有“事实”与“说理”双重要素。前者体现不告不理之诉审原则,划定了上诉不加刑在罪行方面的适用范围;后者构成被追诉人对上诉审裁判的合理预期,为了保障审级制度目的充分实现,立法必须采取措施禁止超出被追诉人合理预期且不利于被追诉人的突袭性裁判。对上诉不加刑原则更为准确的理解是:上诉审法院可以在上诉审范围内对超出上诉理由“说理”要素的部分作出裁判,但这部分裁判不得加重被追诉人的刑罚。上诉不加刑原则的适用基准从来不是“上诉由谁提起”,而是“被追诉人对上诉审裁判的合理预期如何”。在为被告人利益抗诉案件中,检察官的抗诉理由有利于被追诉人,此时加重处罚显然不符合“不利于被告人的预期外裁判禁止理论”,上诉审裁判应受上诉不加刑原则的约束。

英文摘要:

The lack of appeal reason in the appellate system is the root cause of the confusion in the application of the principle of no increase of penalty on appeal. An appeal reason contains the dual elements of “facts” and “reasoning”. The former reflects the principle of no trial without complaint and defines the applicable scope of the principle of no increase of penalty on appeal, while the latter constitutes the “reasonable expectation” of the accused on the appellate judgment. In order to ensure the full realization of the purpose of the trial level system, the legislature must take measures to prohibit surprise judgments that exceed the appellant's “reasonable expectation” and are not favorable to the accused. A more accurate understanding of the principle of no increase of penalty on appeal is that the court of appeal may make a judgment on the part beyond the “reasoning” element of the appeal reason within the scope of appeal, which should not increase the penalty of the accused. The application standard of the principle of no increase of penalty on appeal has never been “who filed the appeal”, but “what the reasonable expectation of the accused on the appeal judgment is”. In a case of protest for the interest of the defendant, the reason for the prosecutor's protest is in favor of the accused. In such a case, an increase of penalty obviously does not conform to “the theory of prohibition of unexpected judgment against the defendant”, and the appellate judgment is bound by the principle of no increase of penalty on appeal.

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