The game analysis of collective litigation can provide the basis of microeconomics and social psychology for the improvement of the collective litigation system. The game in collective litigation is mainly carried out between class members, the class plaintiff and the defendant, the class and the court, as well as the class and the attorney, in each of them the players have specific litigation strategies and benefits. Generally speaking, the two sides of the game can achieve game equilibrium in procedural choice and substantial disposition decision, and find a compromised strategy to satisfy the interests of all players. In various kinds of game in collective litigation, restraining the "free-rider" strategy, adopting the "opt-out" rule, and incentivizing the high-value victims are conducive to maintaining and consolidating the group and realizing the value of collective litigation. In the game between the class plaintiff and the defendant, the choice of tactics of instituting and responding to an action reflects the necessity of coordinating the litigation expectations of parties and promoting litigation cooperation. The settlement game between class plaintiff and the defendant reveals the influence of the litigation cost and the accuracy of procedural operation on the settlement, and the need for the court to coordinate and supervise the settlement of the action. The game of case management in collective litigation shows that the court should be reasonably incentivized to accept class action, and the game of contingent fee needs to be reasonably regulated to prevent the abuse of collective litigation. |